Problems and conflicts are bound to occur when an outside centralised and uniform criminal legal system is implanted onto a totally different culture with no formal unified system of law.
(1) Subject to this paragraph, customary law shall have effect as part of the law of Solomon]
Islands. (2) The preceding subparagraph shall not apply in respect of any customary law that is,] and to the extent that it is, inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, j (3) An Act of Parliament may:-(a) provide for the proof and pleading of customary law for any purpose; i (b) regulate the manner in which or the purposes for which customary law may be^ recognised; and (c) provide for the resolution of conflicts of customary law. Unfortunately again Parliament has not passed any legislation under paragraph 3 of Schedule 3. This has naturally placed the judiciary in a difficult position when customary matters are argued. The difficulty is twofold and was well stated by Kidu C.J. in The State v. Paul Pokolou 4 as being: (a) the failure of lawyers to prove properly the custom upon which they seek to rely; and (b) the failure of Parliament to legislate as to the application of customary law.
The Courts have always recognised customary matters, in varying degrees, in deciding what punishment an offender shall receive. Many cases come before the Courts where prior to the Court case, the matter has been settled in one way or another by customary proceedings and compensation has been paid; or where the accused feels that what he has done is not wrong in custom. What recognition should the Courts give to such settlements or feelings when considering sentence? It seems that the approach in the Pacific has been to say that the more unsophisticated the offender, and the more customary the milieu in which he lives, then the more mitigative a custom settlement will be. There are several illustrations of this, particularly from Papua New Guinea. For example, in Acting Public Prosecution v.
Tumu Waria
5 the judge emphasised that the degree of sophistication of the offender and the traditional ways of his community were important when considering sentence.
This approach reached its zenith in Papua New Guinea in the case of R v. Jim Kaupa 6 (a case of causing death by dangerous driving), where Wilson J. stated:
It is no less important in an emerging country such as Papua New Guinea where there are strong traditional pressures upon a person responsible for the death of another man to pay compensation to the deceaseds kinsmen whatever the courts decision might be, to take into account other punishment which an offender has received such as a liability to pay compensation. Indeed, if a court feels at the time of sentencing that there has already been adequate punishment, no order of a positive aspect is normally desirable. This represents a fairly isolated judicial view and the courts have generally tried to achieve a balance between public policy calling for punishment, whilst at the same time giving allowance in sentencing for customary factors.
Two review cases in Fiji and a recent Solomon Islands case illustrate this balanced approach.
In R v. Naburogo 1 Tuivaga C.J. reduced sentences of six months imprisonment on two offenders for minor storebreaking to binding over orders because, inter alia, compensation had been paid, and the offenders had received six strokes of corporal punishment from the village elders.
Again in R v. gross indecency with other male persons was reduced to twelve months imprisonment. The offender had apologised to the boys' parents and made traditional Fijian peace to them by presenting a whale's tooth; the offender had thought that that was the end of the matter. In the Solomon Islands case, R v. Tovo, 9 the accused had pleaded guilty to defilement of a girl under the age of thirteen. Following the offence there had been a semi-formal village tribunal in which a village chief looked into the matter and had ordered compensation to be paid. This had been done. The village where the offence occurred was very unsophisticated and the people there lived in a traditionally customary way. The Commissioner did not quantify exactly how much credit he gave for this, saying that in cases of customary settlement or punishment each matter must be looked at on its own facts. However, the sentence of two years imprisonment was substantially less than the usual tariff in Solomon Islands for such cases.
There have been trenchant criticisms of the mitigation of sentence approach from the Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea. 10 The Commission said, We believe it unacceptable that a person who is innocent in the eyes of his people in his community and well believes he is doing right should be convicted of an offence. To punish people by applying standards and world views of another people is inherently wrong and is fundamentally unjust. The Commission proposed a defence of customary justification except for unlawful killing or other cases involving serious personal injury. It is interesting to note that in Papua New Guinea, provocation can be an actual defence to assault, (S.272 Criminal Code), a provision that runs against the common law trend that in criminal cases provocation is only a matter of extenuation.
Loumia's case: The importance of this case is that it gave the Solomon Islands Court of Appeal the opportunity to comment on the general application of laws in the country with particular reference to Schedule 3 of the Constitution. The facts of the case were complex but can be summarised briefly as follows:
There had been discord between 2 groups Kwoio (K) and Agia (A) over a land dispute which group K had won in the Courts. Following the hearing in the Customary Land Appeal Court two of group A had been sent to prison for an attack with knives on S who was Loumia's brother. Matters did not calm down as group A were reluctant to accept the Courts decision on the land issue and on 3 August 1984 13 people from group K went armed to a village where a bazaar was being held. This group was led by Loumia and his 2 brothers H and S.
The evidence of events became somewhat conflicting thereafter but group K met up with some members of group A on the village football field and fighting broke out as a result of which S (Loumia's brother was killed), H (his other brother) suffered a terrible facial wound and R, M and L of group A were all killed and found dead in various places along the beach near the village. All 13 of group K were charged on 3 counts of murder and at the trial (Sir John White A.C.J, sitting with local assessors), 11 were acquitted, H was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and Loumia was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Loumia had always admitted killing R, M and L. (R, ironically, had just been released from prison being one of the earlier assailants on S). The defence argued that Loumia was guilty of manslaughter only, on the grounds that: (a) Loumia's seeing his brother S killed and his other brother H maimed so provoked him that a reasonable Kwoio pagan villager would have acted as he did in the heat of the moment; and or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war. Loumia was consequently convicted of murder by the trial judge following the verdict of the assessors, which he accepted. It is important to note that under the Solomon Islands Criminal Procedure Code a judge is not bound to follow the verdict of the assessors.
Loumia's grounds of appeal were:-(a) that the trial judge did not, in his summing up on provocation, direct the assessors on the basis of the direction suggested by Lord Diplock in D.P.P. Loumia never argued that his act was lawful and indeed the opening words of s. 197(c) refer to unlawful acts.
-Both judges emphasised that this line of argument could not stand because the Penal Code was exhaustive on the matters with which it dealt. Section 3 states: 3.
This Code shall be interpreted in accordance with the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance and the principles of legal interpretation obtaining in England, and expressions used in it shall be presumed, so far as is consistent with their context, and except as may be otherwise expressly provided, to be used with the meaning attaching to them in English criminal law and shall be construed in accordance therewith. Obviously English law would not recognise a duty such as that argued. However in reply it could be stated that a Penal Code is in itself subject to the Constitution and that the words 'so far as is consistent with their context, and except as may be otherwise provided' allow room for a more generous interpretation.
Obviously the courts in the Pacific are reluctant to give any encouragement to what have been referred to as revenge killings, or to use the phrase adopted in Papua New Guinea, payback killings. For example Connolly J.A. says:
The Court should not, by its decision, give any encouragement to the view that an alleged duty to maim or otherwise injure the person or property of another can render lawful that which is expressly made unlawful by the statute law of the Solomon Islands.
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And:-It is beyond question that a killing for revenge or retaliation could not have been regarded as a lawful act in the application of the Code or at Common law.
16
It is submitted that the learned judge may have fallen into error in both the above passages in the use of the word 'lawful'. The appellant had all along accepted that his acts were unlawful.
In his judgment, Kapi J. A. states 'At the trial, counsel for the Appellant raised the defence under S. 197(c) of the Penal Code'. This was not raised as a defence but purely as has been reiterated, as a matter of extenuation. Again, Kapi J. A. stated, \ .. he (L) was under a duty in accordance with customary law to kill the deceased in payback'. And referring to S. 197(c), be commented, The essence of this defence is that etc.' These statements support the view put forward that the decision was largely a policy one and that some confusion existed between a defence and a matter of extenuation.
Conclusion:
One can readily understand the reluctance of judges to accept a customary duty to kill as a matter of extenuation and the use of such phrases as 'revenge', 'retaliation', and 'payback' shows how deep this reluctance is. Nevertheless it was clear in this case that L like all bush pagan Kwoio lived his life totally in accordance with custom principles. It cannot, it is submitted, have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution not to acknowledge these principles in some way.
The bush Kwoio, of whom Loumia was one, refuse to acknowledge Christianity in their area, refuse to have their area policed (except by themselves), and refuse to accept officialdom to the extent that they effectively prevented the 1984 General Election taking place in their area. Common sense dictates that some recognition should be given to the customary duty that the appellant was under. This duty affected his state of mind when doing the acts he did. It is submitted that the Constitution implicitly recognises this.
Counsel for the defence at the trial, and on appeal, conceded that it would be difficult for a person who had accepted Christian doctrine or accepted 'Western' standards to set up the matter of extenuation. This is not to justify Loumia's action, but it can be argued that the matter of extenuation had been properly made out and should have been accepted by the Court. The Court could then have marked their opprobrium and disapproval by the length of their sentence (which in theory could have been the life sentence the appellant actually received). This would at least have been more in keeping with some recognition of customary law and at the same time have given the court the opportunity, when sentencing, to discourage killings of this kind. The only solution now lies with Parliament. Reform in this 15. Supra n.l judgment of Connolly J.A. at p.4 thereof.
Ibid.
area is necessary and quite simple, i.e. to abolish the distinction between murder and manslaughter and create one offence of 'unlawful homicide' for which the accused shall be liable to imprisonment for life and thus leave the judges free to sentence at their discretion on the particular facts of each case.
The distinction between murder and manslaughter is now anachronistic arising as it did mainly out of the need to mitigate the effects of capital punishment. It has been and will continue to be the cause of endless wasted hours of judicial and legal time.
